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The shared know-how in Linguistic Bodies
Eros Moreira de Carvalho*
Abstract: The authors of Linguistic Bodies appeal to shared know-how to explain the social and
participatory interactions upon which linguistic skills and agency rest.  However, some issues
lurk around the notion of shared know-how and require attention and clarification. In particular,
one  issue  concerns  the  agent  behind  the  shared  know-how,  a  second one  concerns  whether
shared know-how can be reducible to individual know-how or not. In this paper, I sustain that
there is no single answer to the first issue; depending on the case, shared know-how can belong
to the participants of a social activity or to the system the participants bring forth together. In
relation to the second issue, I sustain, following the authors, a non-reductive account of shared
know-how. I  also suggest  that  responsiveness  to  others,  which  is  a  fundamental  element  of
shared know-how, can be extended by perceptual learning.
Keywords:  shared  know-how,  participatory  sense-making,  social  agency,  responsiveness  to
others, enactivism. 
Introduction
Ezequiel  Di  Paolo,  Elena  Cuffari  and Hanne De Jaegher,  authors  of  Linguistic  Bodies:  The
Continuity between Life and Language (2018), provide us with an exemplar work within the
enactive research program, putting forward in a clear way, step by step, a proposal for scaling up
enactivist explanations to deal with the so called higher-order cognition, in particular, the use of
language. At the same time, and this is another virtue of this book, the authors also show, as
Dreyfus urges us to do (2006, p. 48)1, how our understanding of language may also be scaled
down. We are invited to see language under new lights by removing intellectualist baggage that
works as an obstacle to understanding the phenomenon in question. Language is not to be seen as
disconnected from our more basic and embodied skills,  on the contrary,  it  emerges from the
social interaction between sensorimotor bodies.
* Professor  at  the  Federal  University  of  Rio  Grande  do Sul  and  CNPq Productivity  Research  Fellow;  e-mail:
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1 As he  points  out,  “The time is  ripe  to  put  aside  the  outmoded opposition between analytic  and  continental
philosophy, and to begin the challenging collaborative task of showing how our conceptual capacities grow out of
our nonconceptual ones—how the ground floor of pure perception and receptive coping supports the conceptual
upper stories of the edifice of knowledge.” (2006, pp. 48–49)
In order to achieve the view that linguist bodies “are precarious dynamic processes of navigating
the primordial tension of participatory sense-making in dialogic contexts,” (Di Paolo et al., 2018,
p. 215) the authors show first how sensorimotor bodies become intersubjective bodies and only
then linguistic  bodies.  Along this  development,  the category  of  shared know-how fulfills  an
important explanatory job. Linguistic actions is a specific kind of social action which in turn is a
specific  kind of participatory sense-making. But how participatory sense-making is  possible?
The participants need to coordinate and coregulate themselves to jointly produce a social action.
The authors of Linguistic Bodies appeal to shared know-how to explain how coregulation works.
However, some issues lurk around the notion of shared know-how and require attention and
clarification. In particular, one issue concerns the agent behind the shared know-how, a second
one concerns whether shared know-how can be reducible to individual know-how or not. As to
the first issue, I sustain that there is no single answer to it; depending on the case, shared know
can belong to participants or to the system brought forth by the participants together. In relation
to the second issue, I sustain, following the authors, a non-reductive account of shared know-
how. I also suggest that  responsiveness to others,  which is a fundamental  element  of shared
know-how, can be augmented or extended by perceptual learning.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, I provide a context for understanding the
role that the notion of shared know-how fulfills in Linguistic Bodies. In Section 4, I raise some
concerns about the agent behind the shared know-how, I discuss how the authors answer them
and point out some remaining worries. In Section 5, I discuss the structure of shared know-how
and put forward Birch’s reductive view that shared know-how can be explained as distributed
individual  know-how. In Section 6,  I put forward the authors’ non-reductive view of shared
know-how and discuss the relevance of responsiveness to others for any view of shared know-
how. The dispute between reductive and non-reductive views of shared know-how depends on
how one construes responsiveness to others. I Section 7, I follow the authors in sustaining that
shared  know-how  can  be  an  emergent  skill.  Accordingly,  I  also  provide  a  sketch  of  how
responsiveness to others can be augmented through perceptual learning. Finally, to resume the
remaining worries from Section 4, I sustain that there no single answer to the question about who
is the agent behind shared know-how.
Varieties of know-how
It is not a surprise that the category of know-how has explanatory power for enactivism. If Ryle
is correct, know-how is a kind of embodied knowledge that does not boil down to propositional
knowledge,  in  fact,  the  latter  depends  on  the  former  (1945,  p.  15).  As  a  set  of  complex
dispositions, know-how is flexible,  adaptive,  situated,  relative to a task and ascribable to the
agent as a whole.2 We refer to this kind of knowledge when we want to explain or understand
intelligent actions and performances of an individual. Accordingly, know-how is also expected to
be involved in the explanation of linguistic actions.
Despite not appearing in the Index of the book, the term “know-how” is frequently used, at
different levels of explanation, in the articulation of the model for linguistic bodies. Along the
book, the authors appeal to different types of know-how, such as bodily know-how (2018, p. 48),
shared  know-how  (2018,  p.  75),  interactive  know-how  (2018,  p.  76),  embodied  know-how
(2018, p. 151), pragmatic know-how (2018, p. 166), dialogic know-how (2018, p. 183), linguistic
know-how (2018, p. 206), sensorimotor  know-how (2018, p. 206), conversational  know-how
(2018, p. 243), prereflective know-how (2018, p. 254), grammatical know-how (2018, p. 291),
and ethical know-how (2018, p. 313). As the notion of know-how is itself disputable–see for
instance  the  debate  between  intellectualism  and  anti-intellectualism  (Cath,  2019)–one  may
wonder how central the notion of know-how is for the account provided by the authors, although
this is not my concern here.
The shared know-how
The first reference to shared know-how shows up in Chapter Four, where the authors discuss and
illuminate the passage from sensorimotor bodies to intersubjective bodies. Shared know-how is
mobilized to explain a specific kind of participatory sense-making, in particular joint activity that
generates  social  understanding  that  is  not  reducible  to  the  sum  of  participants’  individual
understanding. Participatory sense-making is social understanding not because it is about social
events but mainly because it is “performed socially,  enacted as a shared practice” (Di Paolo et
2 In fact, if we construe Ryle’s philosophy of mind as a type of holistic behaviorism according to which mental
categories should be construed in terms of abilities and actions already imbued with intentionality due to a history of
interactions  in  a  particular  socio-historical  context,  avoiding  in  this  way  reductive  behaviorism,  then  Ryle’s
philosophy is closer to enactivism than one would otherwise assume (Alksnis and Reynolds, 2019). For comparison,
see the organicistic view of habits put forward by Barandiaran and Di Paolo (Barandiaran and Di Paolo, 2014).
al.,  2018,  pp.  74,  80).  Shared  know-how  is  then  necessary  to  explain  how  two  or  more
individuals coordinate their actions to produce participatory sense-making. As the authors point
out:
[S]hared know-how is jointly constructed between the participants. This shared know-
how does not amount to the sum of the individuals’ know-hows nor does it strictly
“belong” to any of the participants.  It involves instead the practice of coordinating
sensorimotor schemes together, navigating breakdowns, and it belongs to the system
the participants bring forth together: the dyad, the group, the family, the community,
and so on. (Di Paolo et al., 2018, p. 75)
To understand the role of shared know-how, we need first to understand participatory sense-
making and single out the specific kind of participatory sense-making that requires shared know-
how. Examples of participatory sense-making are (1) collaborating in a joint research project, (2)
reaching an agreement after group negotiation, (3) making a shopping list together (De Jaegher
and Di Paolo, 2007, p. 500). Of course, all these examples are complex social practices that have
their own developmental history of interactions. A simpler example would be (4) the activity of
jointly attending to the same object, providing a significance it hasn’t before: a common ground
for further activities of cooperation.  Another simple example is (5) the situation in a narrow
corridor when two participants coming from opposite directions have to cross each other and
they get stuck in alternate lateral movements that prevent them to carry on walking (2007, p.
493). In these situations, the participatory activity of sense-making brings about an autonomous
and self-sustained process, that is,  this social  and interactive process gains a life of its own,
without at the same time suppressing the autonomy of the participants (De Jaegher and Di Paolo,
2007, p. 493; Di Paolo et al., 2018, pp. 70–71). As an autonomous system, this self-sustained
process needs to regulate itself to maintain its identity over time. In fact, it  is by having this
capacity that an autonomous system exhibits  agency, which is defined by the authors as “an
autonomous system capable of regulating its coupling with the environment according to its own
vital norms” (Di Paolo et al., 2018, p. 38).
The coordination patterns  that  bring forth the autonomous systems (1)-(5) affect  in different
ways the sense-making processes of their  participants.  In some cases,  like in (5),  the sense-
making processes remain  an individual  activity,  the participants  are  causally  affected  by the
coordination patters, but they are not trying to regulate these patterns together. In other cases,
like in (1) and (2), the participants become open to a new domain of interaction, they “fully and
directly  participate  in  a  joint  process  of  sense-making  and  the  whole  sense-making  activity
becomes a shared one” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, p. 497). In case (5) we probably have
only regulation but in cases (1) e (2) we have  social regulation enacted by the participatory
sense-making activity. Thus, social interaction emerges as a specific kind of participatory sense-
making.  It  is  at  this  stage,  more  precisely,  where  shared  know-how  enters  to  fulfill  its
explanatory job. It makes social regulation possible.
The agent behind the shared know-how
At this juncture, however, we may start to face a difficulty. Whatever the complex relations of
the social process that emerges from participatory sense-making, they are instantiated partially in
the participants bodies. Despite the alleged autonomy and the relative independence of the social
process from its participants, the former does not exist separated from the latter. But then, who is
responsible for the shared know-how that regulates the social interaction? We cannot forget that
knowing-how,  differently  from blind  habits,  is  an  agent  notion  (Ryle,  1945,  p.  15).  In  the
quotation  above,  the  authors  claim  that  the  shared  know-how  belongs  to  the  system  the
participants bring forth together.  Thus, the system is supposedly the agent behind the shared
know-how. The agency in question, however, cannot be reducible to the participants’ agency,
otherwise the shared know-how would also be reducible to the sum of individual’s know-how,
but it cannot also depart from participants’ agency altogether, otherwise we would need to posit
an  agent  completely  independent  from  the  participants  to  embody  the  shared  know-how.
According to the authors, the solution is to see the regulation of social interaction as coregulation
enacted by the participants themselves, not as individual but as social agents. As they point out:
Coregulation is directed at managing the mismatches between the individual sense-
making of all participants and the patterns that emerge in the interactive dynamics.
This  is  what  we  call  social  agency,  a  specific  kind of  participatory sense-making
whereby the agents not only regulate their own couplings and influence other agents,
but they also jointly regulate the mutual coupling following norms that pertain to the
interactive situation, such as being sensitive to interactive breakdowns and attempting
to recover from them jointly with other participants. (Di Paolo et al., 2018, p. 146)
Thus,  the  system that  can  possess  shared  know-how is  one  that  the  participants  bring  forth
together  in  virtue not  of  their  individual  agencies  but of their  social  agencies.  This solution
requires  that  different  kinds  or  domains  of  agency  can  be  found  in  the  same  participants.
According to the authors, we need to take seriously the emergence of new domains of sensibility
in the participants’ sense-making activity in virtue of their history of interactions. An agent who
regulates her own couplings may be at the same time a participant  who, together with other
participants, jointly regulates their mutual couplings. Notice that although social agency takes
residence in the individual participant, it is a kind of agency that a participant can only manifest
while aiming to act with other participants. As the authors point out, “social agency is always
strictly a joint regulation of the interactive coupling” (Di Paolo et al., 2018, p. 168).
As we are warned from the beginning of  Linguistic Bodies that the book is about interrelated
types of bodies, maybe billions of them (Di Paolo et al., 2018, p. 88), the claim that there are
different  domains  of  agency does  not  come as  a  surprise.  Of course,  there  are  going to  be
tensions between the different bodies and agencies that cohabit the individual diversity that each
one of us is (2018, p. 139), and this raises questions about how these tensions may be addressed.
I will not pursue this path here and will instead stay focused on the discussion about the shared
know-how.3
Yet, some worries remain. First, if the social agency pertains to the participants, why the shared
know-how does belong to the system they bring forth together rather than to the participants
themselves? In case of failure in the exercise of a shared know-how, it may be reasonable, in
some situations, to take a particular participant as more responsible for the failure than others.
But this would be at odds with the assumption that the system is the agent behind the shared
know-how. Second, as the participatory sense-making activity has allegedly some autonomy in
relation to the individual sense-making of the participants, it  is reasonable to assume that the
system the participants bring forth together  enacts a world of significance for itself.  Does it
thereby have experience? To answer these questions, we need to delve into the structure of the
shared know-how.
3 In any case,  it  is  important  to emphasize that this issue about different types of agencies  and bodies has an
important role in the development of the model for linguistic agency, especially because linguist phenomenon is
proposed to be construed as a manifestation or an action of linguistic bodies. In the same way that social agency is a
specific kind of participatory sense-making, linguistic agency is a specific kind of social agency. Thus, seeing how
social bodies emerge from participatory sense-making is a crucial step to show how linguistic bodies emerge from
specific social interactions (Di Paolo et al. 2018, pp. 191–198).
The structure of shared know-how
As we saw, shared know-how emerges from participatory interactions. Consider, for instance,
the social act of giving (Di Paolo et al., 2018, p. 145), discussed by the authors. This act can be
initiated by a participant but cannot be finished by her alone. The act of giving is constituted by
at least two partial acts: (1) the partial act of offering something to someone else and (2) the
partial act of accepting something from someone else. Without the joint coordination of these
partial actions in a social interaction, there is no way to give rise to the act of giving, which is
jointly enacted. The social practice of giving has its own life and history, its interactive pattern
stabilizes only after recurrent social interactions in similar situations through which participants’
contributions are selected for forming a balanced and coordinated set of partial acts (2018, p.
151). This is the general scheme, which allows for cultural, historical and local variations.
Let us point out some further examples of shared know-how that will be relevant later to the
issue of who is the agent behind shared know-how. In order to use efficiently a long two-handled
saw, two individuals need to coordinate their movements, and it may be reasonable to predict
that a pair that has been doing this for a while does it better than a beginner pair. Within certain
limits, any of the individuals, for instance, is able to compensate an eventual disruption from the
other. Conjoined twins that have two unquestionably independent brains learn nevertheless to
coordinate the limbs under their control to move the single body they share. In some cases, they
“are able to unconsciously and effortlessly coordinate their movements to a degree that allows
them to do such things as play softball” (Volz and Gazzaniga, 2017, p. 2055). Finally, during a
match of football, a team may take advantage of the situation in the pitch to launch a very well
coordinated counterattack. The better trained the team, the more coordinated and efficient the
counterattack. In all these cases, shared know-how is involved in the joint production of a social
act.
We may now ask: what is the structure of shared know-how, and how is it related to individual
know-how? The aim of shared know-how is the performance of a social  act,  such as giving
something to someone else, cutting a tree together, moving a single physical body together or
counterattacking the other team. The enactment of a social act depends on the enactment of the
partial  acts  that  constitute  the  former.  The  enactments  of  partial  acts,  in  turn,  need  to  be
coordinated  for  the  successful  production  of  the  social  act.  Finally,  this  coordination  is
something that the participants jointly enact. As there is no completely independent social agent,
nor a single individual regulating alone the social interaction, the social agency and the shared
know-how must be in some way anchored in participant’s skills without being reducible to them.
The question then is how participants contribute to and make coregulation possible.
One suggestion, following Jonathan Birch (Birch, 2018), is that the shared know-how behind
coregulation should be conceived as  distributed know-how. Each participant has a constitutive
part of the shared know-how by knowing how to perform a partial act. It’s not necessary that
each participant knows how to perform all partial acts that constitute a social act. Consider again
the case of the act of giving. One may know how to offer something and yet behaves in a clumsy
way if in the receiver position (e.g. they pertain to a very privileged group whose members rarely
are invited to the position of a receiver). In this sense, the shared know-how may be in some
cases strongly distributed in that no participant needs to know how to perform all partial acts that
constitute a social act. However, each participant needs to know how to perform at least one
partial act. To account for coregulation, it’s also necessary that each participant is able to predict
and  monitor  her  own  actions  as  well  as  actions  of  other  participants  and  to  make  online
adjustments for keeping the social interaction in its correct course. Thus, according to Birch,
shared know-how should be conceived as know-how distributed among different participants
who are socially responsive to each other.
The social dimension of shared know-how
One may wonder  whether  Birch’s account  of shared know-how is a reductive  one in that  it
depends only on individual know-how, even though in a distributed way. This would not be in
line with what the authors claim in Linguistic Bodies. Jonathan Birch characterizes his account of
what  he calls  joint  know-how as  reductive  (Birch,  2018,  p.  3339).  One requirement  he puts
forward for  joint  know-how is  that  a  participant  “knows how to predict,  monitor  and make
failure-averting  adjustments  in  response  to”  another  participant’s  performance,  provided  the
latter  performs  her  action  “in  a  way  that  is  actively  coordination-enabling  for”  the  former
participant  (2018,  p.  3339).  As  I  understand  this  requirement,  social  responsiveness  is  a
condition for joint or shared know-how. Coregulation requires social beings who are responsive
to each other if not as full social agents, then at least as interactive and participatory agents.
The question then comes down to whether social responsiveness can be explained at the level of
the individual only. It is important to notice that when we talk about the social dimension of
shared know-how we may mean two different things. As said before, participatory sense-making
is characterized by the authors as social not because it is about social events but because it is
enacted jointly, because two or more people are coregulating theirs partial actions to perform an
action  jointly,  like  lifting  a  log  together.  At  the  same  time,  as  I  have  been  emphasizing,
coregulating seems to require responsiveness to others as interactive and participatory agents.
The notion of affordance may help us here. What I mean by responsiveness to the other is that
participants need to be able to perceive some social affordances, that is, possibilities of action
that others offer during an interaction (Carvalho, 2019, p. 207).4 When engaged in coregulation,
participants  show up  in  each  other’s  experiences  as  affording  interaction  and  collaboration,
different types of collaboration, depending on the situation. Thus, although coregulation does not
need to be about social events, it  does require social  cognition, perception of what the other
affords  as  a  participatory  agent.  And  here  is  the  crux  of  the  matter,  although  we  cannot
understand  the  ability  to  perceive  social  affordances,  opportunities  for  cooperation,  without
taking in consideration our social environment (Heft, 2007), this ability might not itself be shared
or distributed. It is a type of ability that seems to belong to a single agent. If this is the case, then
coregulation or social regulation can be explained at the level of the individual.
As mentioned at the beginning, the authors claim that “shared know-how does not amount to the
sum of  the  individuals’  know-hows nor  does  it  strictly  ‘belong’  to  any of  the  participants.”
Because shared know-how is distributed, it doesn’t belong to any of the participants in particular,
but  this  doesn’t  seem to  be  sufficient  to  claim  that  it  does  not  amount  to  the  sum of  the
individuals’ know-hows, the know-how that each participant has of how to perform a partial act
in a  responsive way.  A reductivist  regarding shared know-how could claim that coregulation
requires nothing more than know-how of partial acts possessed by individuals that are minimally
responsive  to  each  other’s  affordances.  The  ability  to  perceive  social  affordances,  which  is
required to account for responsiveness to others, does not seem to be shared, even though it may
be legitimately called a social ability.
4 At  a  level  even  more  basic,  participants  need  also  to  be  able  to  have  joint  perception,  “perception  of  the
environment … that is enjoyed by two individuals together” (Seemann, 2019, p. 2). This is not perception of other’s
affordances but of shared objects. Thus, responsiveness to others requires both perception of what others afford and
joint perception.
The authors of Linguistic Bodies might respond, as in fact they do, that responsiveness to others
is itself constituted through an interactive process and, therefore, is a species of shared know-
how; as they point out, “sensitivity for others and for the self is gradually built into the skills and
capacities of the participants as we move through the stages of the model” (Di Paolo et al., 2018,
p. 162). According to Martens and Schlicht, however, this non-reductive account aims for the
impossible since it assumes what it is supposed to explain. As they point out, “accounts aiming
to explain social cognition in terms of joint action are ultimately circular since joint action of the
relevant kind presupposes social cognition of a basic kind” (Martens and Schlicht, 2018, p. 246).
For Martens and Schlicht, responsiveness to others is so basic that it cannot be the result of a
history of interactions. Actually, these interactions depends on previous responsiveness to others
to take place.
Learning to be responsive to others
We have raised two intertwined questions along this paper. One is whether basic responsiveness
to others can emerge from a history of interactions between beings who do not have yet any
social  capability,  and  the  other—as  we saw in  Section  Four—is  whether  shared  know-how
belongs to the participants or to the system that the participants bring forth together. It’s possible
that  shared know-how but not responsiveness to others is emergent—it  is learned instead of
being the product of natural selection. Besides, whether shared know-how is emergent or not
does not seem to depend on whether it belongs to participants or to the system the participants
bring forth together. I also do not think that there is a clear-cut answer to the second question.
First, I do not think that the authors of Linguistic Bodies are or need to be committed to the claim
that even the  most basic kind of responsiveness to others is a capacity that one learns trough
interactions. Indeed, they claim that “we assume the most basic form of sensitivity [for others] to
start  with,  which is  almost  no sensitivity  at  all”  (Di Paolo et  al.,  2018, p. 162). The adverb
“almost” does the trick here. In my view, their point is that the more elaborate responsiveness to
others is learned and culturally shaped but this does not rule out basic non-emergent (innate)
forms of responsiveness to others. As they point out, “the model shows how from a stripped-
down version of participatory sense-making (i.e., an interactive situation between autonomous
agents  without  any  other  concrete  presuppositions)  it  is  possible  to  elaborate  increasingly
concrete stages involving different kinds of social agency.” (Di Paolo et al., 2018, p. 161). This
is compatible with assuming participants with a minimal openness to others. Besides, it’s not
clear in this debate what should count as basic or minimal responsiveness to others. For instance,
for getting more elaborate kinds of social  agency through a history of interactions it may be
enough to have as a starting point a non-emergent disposition to look for faces and patterns of
behaviors.  This  disposition  may  be  sufficient  to  start  an  emergent  coordination  among
participants  that  will  make  possible  a  stripped-down  version  of  participatory  sense-making.
Finally,  there  has  been  accumulating  evidence  that  cognitive  abilities  such  as  imitation,
mindreading, and metacognition, however one construes them, arise in individual development
and are better explained by cultural selection (Heyes et al., 2020). The same may apply to more
elaborate forms of responsiveness to others.
Second, I submit that responsiveness to other can be augmented through perceptual learning.
Interactions can be embodied in the same way that tools are embodied to extend our perceptual
capacities. As it is lively discussed by Merleau-Ponty (2012, pp. 144–46, 153–155) and Polanyi
(2009, pp. 12–14), a blind person habituates to use a cane to perceive their surroundings with the
cane. It is true that initially the blind person feels the cane with their hand—the cane pressing
their skin. After exploring, however, the world with the cane for a while, becoming familiar with
its  length,  shape and weight,  and how it  absorbs impacts,  the blind person starts to perceive
features of the objects with the cane. By habituating and incorporating the cane, the blind person
dilates their being in the world (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 145), new perceptions emerge and the
blind person is now able to attend to what is within the reach of their cane. A new perceptual
skill is thus acquired. 
Although I can only offer a sketch here, I think that the ability of social perception may emerge
or be extended in a similar fashion. By exploring others with different interactions in different
situations and observing how they react and reciprocate, a participant can acquire the ability to
directly attend to others’ possibilities for interaction. After becoming familiarized with a certain
person, certain groups of people, or others in general, a participant stops attending to their own
interactions and starts to perceive  with these interactions what others afford. Actually, it is not
only a process of familiarization but also of coupling since the participant also selects for future
interactions the interventions that were more successful in keeping coordination. This in turn
cannot be thought without the active role of the other participant who is also making parallel
adjustments and in this way helping both to become coupled to each other. Thus, the agents
embody their  own interactions  to  extend their  perceptual  power,  allowing the emergence  of
increasingly responsiveness to others. This extension of perceptual power is something that both
participants achieve together. This in turn paves the way for the emergence of elaborate forms of
social agency and coregulation. If this is the case, individual processes alone cannot account for
either responsiveness to other or shared know-how.
Regarding the second question, I do not think that there is a unique answer to all cases of shared
know-how. In some cases, the shared know-how may belong to the system, but in others, it may
belong  to  he  participants,  that  is,  their  individual  know-how  may  be  sufficient  to  explain
coregulation and the production of the corresponding social act. It all depends on whether the
system the participants bring forth possesses enough agency to be responsible for the shared
know-how in question. It may not be easy to tell which case is which. The degree of coupling
among  the  participants  and  the  observers’  dispositions  to  ascribe  merit  and  demerit  to
participants  or  to  the  system  to  explain  their  joint  performances  are  reasonable  criteria  to
distinguish between these cases.
A clear case of shared know-how that belongs to the participants is the situation of a pair cutting
a tree with a long two-handled saw, even if we assume that they are an experienced pair. Despite
the high degree of their coupling while they are using the two-handled saw, the majority of the
breakdowns may be traceable to one or another participant. It may well be the case, in some
situations, that one of them deserves more credit than the other for the successful act of cutting a
tree. Thus, it does not seem that the system formed by the two participants and the two-handled
saw has sufficient agency to be responsible for the shared know-how in question.
In  the  other  extreme,  we  have  the  case  of  a  professional  team  of  football  performing  a
counterattack. Of course, the blame for an unsuccessful counterattack may, depending on what
happens  in  the  pitch,  be  ascribed  to  a  single  player,  but  normally  it  is  the  team that,  as  a
collective, may perform poorly and then deserve the blame. Besides, in the case of professional
teams, there is a new domain of social agency in play, for the players also share an embodied
social identity (Weichold and Thonhauser, 2020, p. 17). During a match, they act as a collective.
It is the team that sees an opportunity for a counterattack—in virtue of rigorous training the team
is attuned to certain configurations in the pitch and therefore may have experience of it—, not an
individual  player.5 Here the  system of  players  as  a  whole seems to  have  enough agency to
deserve  merit  or  demerit  for  respectively  good  or  poor  joint  performances.  Thus,  the
corresponding shared know-how belongs to the system.
The case of the conjoined twins with separated brains may be more complicated. On the on hand,
they have different personalities, desires and sets of beliefs. They seem to be two persons trying
to dwell and share the same physical body. And despite the fact that they are seen and described
by the interactive kind (Hacking, 1999, p. 32) “conjoined twins”, which may have a feedback
effect  on  how they  see  themselves,  they  might  usually  not  be  guided  by  any  strong  social
identity. In many daily affairs, the conjoined twins look like the pair of participants in the first
case, two people acting together to obtain common goals. We can easily imagine them fighting
and blaming each other for breakdowns in the control of their shared body. It seems then that the
shared know-how behind the ability to control their body is distributed among the twins. Each of
them knows how to move the part of the body under their control and monitor and predict the
movements of the other part in order to keep a joint control of their shared body. On the other
hand, the degree of coupling they achieve in some activities, like in playing softball, may be so
high that they may be act and be seen as just a single agent in these occasions. In this context,
they may embody a common social agency due to past training. Accordingly, when something
goes wrong, it is the agency of “the” twins that is to blame. This should not come as surprising.
Like the case of the professional team, the same group of individuals may act during a match as a
single collective but in other situations only as a group of individuals, for instance when they
jointly organize a party. It also happens with couples, although they are normally two distinct
persons, sometimes they act as if they were just one—assuming that they both let each other be
just one (De Jaegher, 2019). Thus, depending on the activity and the degree of the coupling
involved, there are cases in which the shared know-how belongs to the system, which then has
enough agency to be responsible for its performances, and there are other cases in which the
shared know-how belongs to the participants.
5 Or one can make the weaker claim that the team only detects or acts upon an opportunity for a counterattack, since
having agency might not be equivalent to have subjectivity or a first-person perspective.  One reason for this is that a
team lacks what would be the equivalent to an interoceptive system that  is  allegedly necessary for  subjectivity
(Stapleton and Froese, 2015, 232). 
Concluding Remarks
Shared know-how is a complex kind of ability. At the same time that shared know-how turns
social acts possible, it seems to require responsiveness to others to work. This raises the question
of whether shared know-how is an emergent ability or not. Following the authors of Linguistic
Bodies, I tried to sustain that it is. Even responsiveness to others may be augmented or extended
by perceptual learning. Another relevant question regarding the structure of shared know-how is
whether it should be conceived as distributed individual know-how or as a whole ascribable only
to systems or collectives. I have argued that there is not a single answer to this question. As
know-how  is  an  agent  notion,  it  cannot  be  separated  from  issues  regarding  responsibility.
Whether shared know-how belongs to the system or to the participants depends on the degree of
the coupling among the participants that bring forth a system and on how that system relates to
our practices of ascribing merit and demerit. As we discussed, in some cases the shared know-
how belongs to the system, in others to the participants.
I have called attention to just one topic among many others developed in Linguistic Bodies and
hope to have helped to pursue further some aspects of the notion of shared know-how. I was not
able to do full justice to this wonderful book in this single paper, but this is because I’m just
beginning a journey of exploration that will last for the years to come.
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